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Abstract There is growing agreement among taxonomists that species are indepen-
dently evolving lineages. The central notion of this conception, evolutionary indepen-
dence, is commonly operationalized by taxonomists in multiple, diverging ways. This
leads to a problem of operationalization-dependency in species classification, as species
delimitation is not only dependent on the properties of the investigated groups, but also
on how taxonomists choose to operationalize evolutionary independence. The question
then is how the operationalization-dependency of species delimitation is compatible
with its objectivity and reliability. In response to this problem, various taxonomists
have proposed to integrate multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence
for delimiting species. This paper first distinguishes between a standard and a sophis-
ticated integrative approach to taxonomy, and argues that it is unclear how either of
these can support the reliability and objectivity of species delimitation. It then draws a
parallel between the measurement of physical quantities and species delimitation to
argue that species delimitation can be considered objective and reliable if we under-
stand the sophisticated integrative approach as assessing the coherence between the
idealized models of multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence.
Keywords Integrative taxonomy. Species delimitation . Species classification .
Evolutionary independence .Measurement . Operationalization
1 Introduction
Despite numerous unresolved issues in philosophical debates about the nature of
species, there is growing consensus among taxonomists that the aim of species
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delimitation is to identify independently evolving lineages (e.g. Fujita et al. 2012;
Padial and De La Riva 2010).1 This paper takes this view on species as a given, and
aims to resolve an epistemological problem faced by taxonomists who adopt it for
species delimitation. The problem, which I will call the problem of operationalization-
dependency (POD henceforth), is that evolutionary independence can be, and in
practice is, operationalized in innumerable ways, many of which lead to diverging
outcomes. Hence, the results of species delimitation seem to depend as much on
taxonomists’ choice of operationalization as on the properties of the groups they
investigate. This poses a problem, because it seems incompatible with two major
desiderata of taxonomy, namely, the reliability and objectivity of classifications. The
aim of this paper is to show that the operationalization-dependency of species delim-
itation does not necessarily obstruct the fulfilment of these desiderata.
To do this, section 2 spells out the POD and presents integrative taxonomy, a
commonly adopted solution to this problem. I distinguish between two interpretations
of integrative taxonomy, and argue that it is not clear how either of those can support
the objectivity and reliability of species classification. Section 3 then turns to
the philosophy of measurement, and shows how a model-based account of
measurement solves an analogous problem in the measurement of physical
quantities. Section 4 discusses a case-study to show that the sophisticated
integrative approach to taxonomy solves the POD in a similar way. The paper
finishes in section 5 with concluding remarks.
Before I set out to do this, it is worth emphasizing that this paper deals only with the
epistemology of species delimitation, and does not make any commitments about the
metaphysics of species.2 Most importantly, my points are compatible both with con-
ventionalist and realist views about species. This is because even if one adopts realism
and holds that there is a matter of fact about the evolutionary independence of a lineage,
it remains the case that taxonomists can only access this through various diverging
operationalizations. Thus, the POD affects species delimitation regardless of the meta-
physical views we adopt. This is not to say that the POD is entirely independent from
the metaphysics of species. If, as many have argued, pluralism about lineages is true
and evolutionary independence comes in degrees, it should be expected that different
operationalizations lead to different outcomes (Ereshefsky 1992; Degnan and
Rosenberg 2006; Haber 2012; Maddison 1997). Indeed, as will become clear in the
last section of the paper, understanding this may be epistemically valuable, for example
when knowledge on the differences between various operationalizations can be imple-
mented in species delimitation (Degnan and Rosenberg 2009; Haber 2016). However,
even if this metaphysical picture holds, it remains the case that taxonomists have to get
on with the task of recognising certain groups of organisms as species. Thus,
1 This can be interpreted either in a backward-looking way, in which species are the lineages that result from
independent evolution, or in a forward-looking way, in which species are the entities that evolve (Reydon
2005). As the difference between these is not relevant here, I will not distinguish between them.
2 That is, aside from the assumption that species delimitation aims to pick out independently evolving
lineages. However, an argument analogous to the one in this paper can be made about any other general
conception of species that can be operationalized in many ways. This definitely seems to be the case for the
view that species are taxa (see Baum 2009), which in the current literature is the main contender for a general
view on species.
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metaphysically problematic as it may be, they must face the multiplicity of
operationalizations and solve the POD.
By focusing on the epistemology of species delimitation rather than the metaphys-
ical nature of species, this paper deviates from the largest part of the philosophical
literature on species. Instead, it picks up on the research cited above which highlights
the epistemological implications of our growing understanding of the nature of species
(Degnan and Rosenberg 2006, 2009; Haber 2012, 2016; Maddison 1997; Sterner
2017). This paper advances such research by developing one particularly important
epistemological problem in more detail (i.e., the POD) and proposing a potential
solution. This fresh, epistemological perspective demonstrates an interesting and
underexplored role for philosophy in questions about species.3 Moreover, the focus
on epistemology is in line with an increasing theoretical interest in the taxonomic
literature in methods of species delimitation (Sites and Marshall 2004; Camargo and
Sites 2013; Leavitt et al. 2015).
2 Integrative taxonomy and the problem of operationalization-dependency
In order to clarify the POD, it is helpful to consider what taxonomists mean by
‘independently evolving lineages’. By ‘lineages’ they mean ancestor-descendant se-
quences of populations with a unique evolutionary origin; but what is meant by
‘independently evolving’ is notoriously hard to elucidate. Most commonly, it is claimed
that a lineage evolves independently if the organisms that make up its populations
generally face evolutionary pressures as a unit, distinct from other such units (Wiley
1978). In other words, independently evolving lineages are groups of organisms that
are cohesive in an evolutionary sense. The result of this evolutionary cohesion is that
the organisms that make up these lineages have a shared unique path through evolu-
tionary space. This means that we can characterise the evolutionary independence of a
lineage as the evolutionary fate sharing of the organisms that make up the lineage
(Barker 2007; Barker and Wilson 2010).
It should be noted that the fate sharing of organisms within a lineage need not be
absolute. Indeed, some differences are expected, as intraspecific variation is a crucial
requirement for evolution to occur. The distinctness of the fate of organisms between
species-lineages is not absolute either. For example, there is a significant sense in which
humans and chimpanzees share an evolutionary fate not shared by tigers, but they are
clearly part of different species-lineages. In other words, evolutionary fate sharing is a
matter of degree, and consequently the evolutionary independence of species-lineages
is a matter of degree too. Species, then, are generally characterised as groups of
organisms with relatively high degrees of fate sharing. This raises two questions
concerning evolutionary independence that are crucial for species delimitation. First,
the question of how high this degree of independence should be for a lineage to qualify
as a species. I will not go into this issue. Instead, I focus on a more fundamental
3 In this sense, it takes the cue from David Hull (1997, 372–373), who wrote in relation to species that
‘[u]nfortunately, philosophers have not addressed this question [about operationalization] in any detail […].
For any student of science who is getting a bit bored with the Covering Law Model of Scientific Explanation
or incommensurability, the topic of operationalizing concepts is wide open.’
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question that needs answering before a particular degree of independence can be
chosen. This is the question of how one can determine the degree of evolutionary
independence in the first place.4
This question is particularly pressing because the characterization of evolutionary
independence in terms of evolutionary fate sharing is highly theoretical and, some have
argued, vague (Ereshefsky 1991; Wheeler and Meier 2000). Despite the lack of a
precise definition, taxonomists engaged in species delimitation have to assess the
degree of evolutionary independence. They do this either through the processes that
cause evolutionary fate sharing, or through the patterns resulting from these processes.
The causes of fate sharing that taxonomists commonly rely on for species delimitation
include gene-flow, reproductive interactions and shared selection pressures. The pat-
terns resulting from these processes include phenotypic and genotypic similarity,
monophyly, and genealogical relations between organisms.5 Together, these processes
and patterns provide multiple ways of operationalizing the notion of evolutionary
independence for species delimitation.
Various authors have argued that this diversity of operationalizations of the single
abstract conceptualization of species is important to capture the broad variety of species
lineages in the organic world (Mayden 1999, 97; De Queiroz 2007, 879). However, this
advantage comes with an important worry on the other side of the coin. It is well known
that the various operationalizations associated with evolutionary independence do not
always lead to the same results. For example, many groups that are morphologically
diagnosable are not reproductively isolated, while there are also many morphologically
indistinguishable groups that are reproductively isolated. More generally, various
authors show that disagreement between these operationalizations is more common
than agreement (Padial et al. 2009; Schlick-Steiner et al. 2010; Willis 2017). In practice,
this means that different operationalizations of evolutionary independence tend
to pick out different groups as species. It follows then that depending on how
taxonomists decide to operationalize the notion of evolutionary independence,
different species delimitations result. This is what I call the operationalization-
dependency of species delimitation.6
Various authors point out that the operationalization-dependency of taxonomy forms
a threat to the epistemic value of species delimitation (e.g. Schlick-Steiner et al. 2010;
Willis 2017). Fujita et al. (2012, 481), for example, comment on the ‘inherent subjec-
tivity’ of choosing proxies (i.e. operationalizations) of independent evolution and how
this negatively affects the repeatability of species delimitation. More precisely,
operationalization-dependency seems to constitute a lack of objectivity of species
delimitation. Defining objectivity in detail is of course beyond the scope of this paper;
I will use it here to refer to anything that is not dependent on a particular point of view
4 Another way of putting this is to say that the question at hand is about the measurement of evolutionary
independence. I develop this line of thought further in section 3.
5 Note that there is no clear distinction between the causes and effects of evolutionary independence. For
example, gene-flow and shared selection pressures lead to increased phenotypic and genotypic similarity,
which in turn increase reproductive isolation and the similarity in the way organisms respond to selection
pressures.
6 Taxonomists often use the term ‘researcher bias’ for this. While this term better conveys the fact that
researchers’ choices indirectly play an important role in species delimitation, I use the term ‘operationalization-
dependency’ instead to avoid confusion with systematic error and to emphasize the importance of
operationalization.
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or perspective. By this meaning, operationalization-dependency constitutes a lack of
objectivity because the outcome of species delimitation is directly dependent on the
particular operationalization (i.e. perspective) that is adopted. This lack of objectivity in
turn raises worries for the reliability of these operationalizations. Assuming that the
diverging outcomes of different operationalizations cannot all be accepted, it must be
that they sometimes fail to track evolutionary independence.7 Given that we can only
access evolutionary independence through these operationalizations, there is no inde-
pendent criterion to decide which ones to trust. It is unclear then why we should trust
these operationalizations as reliably picking out independently evolving lineages.
These problems, which I jointly refer to as the POD, are particularly worrying because
they form a threat to two further desiderata of biological taxonomy, namely, the stability of
species classifications and the comparability of the species they consist of. If species
delimitation is subjective and unreliable in the sense described here, classifications are likely
to change frequently when different operationalizations are used to investigate the same
groups. This instability poses a problem for users of taxonomy, such as conservation
legislation and policies, which have to adapt to these changes. Similarly, the dependence
of species delimitation on the adopted operationalization puts into question the extent to
which various groups recognised as species are comparable. This is important because
research in other fields, such as macro-evolutionary research and conservation biology,
implicitly depends on species being similar in certain respects (Isaac et al. 2004).
In response to these epistemological problems, particularly the lack of comparability,
Mishler (1999) argues that we should ‘get rid’ of the species rank, thus solving the POD
by dissolution.8 Rather than adopting this radical solution, various taxonomists propose
to solve the POD by adopting a novel approach to species delimitation called ‘integra-
tive taxonomy’, which uses multiple operationalizations of evolutionary inde-
pendence for species delimitation (Dayrat 2005; Padial et al. 2010; Will et al.
2005). In practice, integrative taxonomy is most commonly applied in the form
of the requirement that lineages should be recognized only when all or most
operationalizations converge on the same outcome. I will call this ‘the standard
approach’ to integrative taxonomy.9 The idea behind this standard interpretation
is that it is very unlikely that multiple operationalizations that are all wrong
would yield the same result. Thus, the robustness of a particular species
delimitation over multiple operationalizations is taken as a sign of its reliability
on the basis of a no-coincidence argument. This robustness also provides an
easy response to the worry that species delimitation is not objective. Given that
the standard approach integrates various points of view, species delimitation is
no longer dependent on a single perspective. Instead, it is objective in the sense
of inter-subjectivity.10
7 As noted in the introduction, a metaphysical pluralist could point out here that it might just be that they are
all correct. However, given that accepting innumerably many species is not a feasible option in taxonomy, this
does not defuse the epistemological problem faced by taxonomists who have to accept some
operationalizations as reliable and reject others.
8 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
9 For examples of this standard approach, see Alström et al. (2008) and Vieites et al. (2009), who claim that
groups should only be recognised as species if there is agreement between most or all criteria for species
status.
10 I say more about this sense of objectivity at the end of sections 3 and 4.
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However, the standard approach faces an important problem. As discussed above,
many currently recognised species, including well-established ones, would not be
picked out by all commonly used operationalizations of evolutionary independence.
One particularly clear illustration of this comes from the work of Degnan and Rosen-
berg (2006), which shows that incongruence between the majority gene-tree and
population tree of a group is not only possible, but highly likely under certain common
conditions. The prevalence of such diverging operationalizations implies that the
standard approach risks not recognising many groups that we would want to accept
as species, and when applied very strictly, might even make species delimitation
impossible. In response to this problem of false negatives, various authors propose a
more sophisticated integrative approach, which uses multiple operationalizations but
does not require absolute convergence (Padial et al. 2009; Padial et al. 2010; Schlick-
Steiner et al. 2010).11 This sophisticated approach requires taxonomists to decide which
operationalizations reliably track evolutionary independence, and which are erroneous
or in need of correction. However, this was precisely what led taxonomists to adopt an
integrative approach in the first place. Given that this decision is underdetermined by
the operationalizations, this means that taxonomists must also rely on background
theory for this. Thus, theoretical assumptions play a crucial role in integrating multiple
operationalizations on the sophisticated integrative approach. This does not mean, of
course, that the standard approach does not rely on background theory at all. Rather, the
point is that, unlike the sophisticated approach, the standard approach does not use this
background theory to correct and integrate diverging operationalizations.
While the sophisticated integrative approach avoids the problem of false negatives, it
faces different but equally troubling problems. Most importantly, it is not clear how the
integration of multiple fallible operationalizations, some of which are explicitly as-
sumed to be erroneous, can increase the objectivity and reliability of species delimita-
tion. Unlike the standard approach, the sophisticated approach cannot rely on a no-
coincidence argument. Given that the sophisticated account relies on background
assumptions to retain, correct and dismiss various diverging operationalizations, any
resulting convergence is the result of taxonomists moulding the evidence to fit together.
This moulded convergence of operationalizations could hardly serve as the basis for a
no-coincidence argument.
The natural response of the integrative taxonomists here is to claim that there is a
commonly accepted set of background assumptions that uniquely determine integra-
tion. However, as discussed above, evolutionary independence is a vague theoretical
notion. This is precisely why taxonomists have to rely on multiple operationalizations
for species delimitation in the first place. In other words, operationalizations are
required to refine the theory, while the same theory is required to integrate the
operationalizations.12 Consequently, it is not always clear which background assump-
tions to adopt. Yeates et al. (2011, 210) point out that in the context of tracking
11 Note that by using the term ‘false negative’ (and ‘false positive’ in section 4) I am not making the
metaphysical claim that there is a particular fixed number of good species, and that the standard approach
fails to recognise some of them. Rather, I remain agnostic about this, and use the term with reference to the
species that are currently well-established. The point, then, is that the standard approach would fail to pick out
many currently well-established species. I thank John Dupré for pointing this out.
12 This circularity is related to Chang’s (1995) ‘problem of nomic measurement’ and Tal’s (2011) ‘multiple
realizability of unit definitions’. I connect the POD with these measurement-problems in the next section.
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evolutionary independence, ‘the ways in which any data source [operationalization]
may fail are almost limitless’. Two operationalizations can diverge because of limited
data, the choice of statistical methods and model of evolution, or simply because of the
differential operation of one of the many processes that shape evolutionary change.
Given the complexity of the organic world and the practically limitless set of
operationalizations, this integration can often be done in many different ways, leading
to different results. The upshot of this is that operationalization-dependency enters
species delimitation especially on the sophisticated integrative approach through the
choice between various ways of correcting diverging evidence.13 In short then, instead
of eliminating operationalization-dependency and guaranteeing the objectivity and
reliability of species classifications, sophisticated integrative taxonomy seems to add
even more fuel to the POD.
3 The model-based account of measurement
The previous section argued that the standard approach to integrative taxonomy is not
helpful because it risks overlooking many good species, while it is not clear how the
sophisticated approach can guarantee the reliability and objectivity of species delimi-
tation. Given that the problem for the sophisticated integrative approach concerns the
reliable determination of the degree of evolutionary independence of a lineage, we can
think of this as a problem of measurement reliability. In line with this, I now turn to the
philosophy of measurement for a solution. This section discusses a problem in the
measurement of physical quantities that is highly similar to the POD in species
delimitation. I then point to the way the model-based account of measurement makes
sense of the objectivity and reliability of measurement despite this problem. This will
allow me in section 4 to apply the model-based account of measurement to species
delimitation to show that sophisticated integrative species delimitation, like measure-
ment, is objective and reliable in a substantial sense.
The POD in the measurement of physical quantities is easiest to explain using the
example of measuring temperature (see Chang 2004; Tal 2017). Temperature is often
measured by the rate of expansion of fluids when heated. Different thermometers use
different fluids, such as mercury or alcohol, and different containers. This poses a
problem, because these fluids and containers do not all expand at the same rate. This
means that if one assumes that the readings of each thermometer are linearly correlated
with the temperature, they give different results for the same quantities. In order to
avoid the conclusion that different thermometers measure different quantities, we have
to adopt different, non-linear conversion schemes between the thermometer-readings
and the measured temperature. As the choice between these conversion schemes is not
determined by the thermometer readings themselves, we must rely on our theoretical
understanding of the measurement system and further background assumptions. The
same thermometer-readings then can be interpreted as indicating different temperatures
depending on which background assumptions are adopted. This seems to lead to a POD
in the measurement of temperature, as the outcome of measurement is dependent not
13 See Schlick-Steiner et al. (2010, 428) for an idealized overview of the sophisticated integrative research
process which identifies all sources of operationalization-dependency (referred to as ‘researcher bias’).
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only on the measured quantity, but also on the particular set of theoretical assumptions
we choose.
This POD is in various ways similar to the POD in species delimitation. First, both
evolutionary independence and temperature are abstract theoretical notions that can
only be accessed through the various ways in which they are operationalized. Second,
these operationalizations sometimes lead to diverging results. This is a problem because
there is no standard external to the operationalizations we can turn to in order to decide
which operationalizations reliably track the research object, and which are irrelevant or
faulty. Thus, the scientists have to rely on background assumptions in order to integrate
various operationalizations. Third, this leads to a POD because there may be various
plausible ways of integrating different operationalizations, and no straightforward way
of choosing between these. That means that the outcomes of research might reflect the
particular operationalization rather than the temperature or evolutionary independence
they set out to determine. In both cases, this poses the question of how the outcomes of
research can be thought to be reliable and objective.
At this point, I would like to refer to the way Eran Tal’s model-based view on
measurement proposes to answer this question.14 I focus on this philosophical view on
measurement because it was developed specifically to make sense of both the episte-
mological problems scientists encounter in the practice of measurement, and their
success (and sometimes failure) in dealing with these problems. Most broadly, the
model-based account views measurement as assigning values to parameters in an
idealized model that comprises the measurement process, the measurement environ-
ment and the system under measurement. Measurement is considered successful if it
can be shown that different operationalizations converge within the limits of diver-
gences that can be theoretically explained and predicted by their models. I lack the
space here to provide a full overview of this account. Instead, I will focus on three
central aspects that are particularly relevant for the POD:
Indications vs. outcomes Crucial to the model-based view is the distinction between
measurement indications, which are the meter-readings or other end-states of the
measuring instrument (e.g. the dial is at the mark of 40), and measurement outcomes,
which are knowledge claims about the measured quantity inferred from the indications
(e.g. the room temperature is 40 ± 1 °C). It is important to see that measurement
indications per se do not say anything about the measured quantity yet. It is only after
they have been interpreted using the theoretical assumptions and conversion schemes
discussed above that they become knowledge claims. For example, it may be part of
our theoretical understanding of the thermometer that it is only accurate within 1 °C, so
the measurement outcome must include an error range.
Idealization The distinction between outcomes and indications brings to light the
importance of idealization in measurement. Indications are the result of the interaction
between the researcher, instrument, measured quantity, and environment. This means
that variations in indications reflect not only variations in the measured quantity, but
also various sources of background noise. The aim of moving from indications to
outcomes is to pick out the relevant variation, and neglect variation due to background
14 The discussion in this section and the next draws heavily from Tal (2017), see also Tal (2011, 2013)
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noise. Because this inference is underdetermined by the operationalizations, scientists
also have to rely on background knowledge for this. This is done by representing the
instrument in a manner that distinguishes between the idealized measurement proce-
dure and the various ways in which the actual procedure diverges from this ideal. For
example, different glass containers expand differentially when heated, and thus influ-
ence the thermometer indications. In the model of the thermometer, this influence is
accounted for and idealized away as reflecting the particular choice of container rather
than variations in the measured quantity. The idealized model thus makes possible the
inference of measurement outcomes from measurement indications (e.g. after correc-
tion, the dial that is at the 40 mark is interpreted as 39 °C).
Coherence Given that measurement indications are influenced by a wide range of
factors, there are usually multiple ways of correcting operationalizations, and hence, of
constructing such models. This raises the question of how scientists are to choose
between these, and more generally, how they should decide whether a particular
measurement outcome successfully measures the quantity. Tal argues that the use of
multiple operationalizations together with considerations of coherence play a crucial
role in this. He holds that various operationalizations can be considered to track a
quantity successfully ‘once their idiosyncrasies are idealized away in a mutually
coherent fashion’ (Tal 2017, 248). For example, the thermometer indicating 40 °C
can be considered coherent with one indicating 42 °C if their theoretical models predict
that both are only accurate within 1 °C (e.g. because of the impact of the material the
containers are made of). Note that there are two levels of models at work here. First,
there is a model of each operationalization and the various ways it deviates from the
ideal procedure. This model allows us to infer outcomes from the indications of that
operationalization. Then there is a higher-level model that incorporates these various
operationalizations and allows us to assess their mutual coherence.
In short then, the model-based account defines successful measurement as the
convergence of outcomes under the models of multiple operationalizations. By tying
the success of measurement to the coherence between various operationalizations of a
quantity, this view explains how measurement can be reliable despite its being based on
integrating diverging and fallible operationalizations. By locating this coherence in the
idealized model of various operationalizations, the view explains how coherence is
possible despite divergence between indications.
This model-based view explains how the POD is compatible with the reliability and
objectivity of measurement. As Basso (2017) points out, the reliability of measurement
on the model-based account depends on the robustness of measurement outcomes over
multiple operationalizations. Importantly, this robustness does not lie in the simple
convergence of the indications of various operationalizations; rather, it lies in the
convergence of the idealized representations of these operationalizations. What robust-
ness indicates then is the fit between the actual convergence of operationalizations and
the convergence expected by the idealized model of these operationalizations. This fit
can then be tested by checking whether the predictions made on the basis of the model
are borne out. A bad fit indicates a lack of coherence due to error that has not been
accounted for. A good fit, on the other hand, implies that the indications are not
erroneous beyond what we can correct for in the model, and hence, that the outcomes
reflect the quantity we set out to measure.
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At first sight, one might think that this model-based account of the reliability of
measurement is incompatible with the objectivity of measurement. Given that successful
measurement is defined with reference to idealized models, it is clear that measurement
outcomes are dependent on the choice of model and theoretical assumptions. Thus, they are
not objective in the sense of independence from any perspective. However, Tal argues that
there is another substantial sense in which measurement on the model-based account is
objective. He argues that because the success of measurement depends on the convergence
between multiple idealized operationalizations, it is objective in the sense of ‘perspective
invariance’ (Tal 2017, 248). That is, even if good measurement outcomes are not perspec-
tive-independent, they are also not dependent on one particular perspective. Instead, con-
vergence of different operationalizations guarantees that the outcome is robust across a range
of perspectives. This ‘robust perspectivism’, as Tal (2017, 248-249) calls it, shows how the
POD and objectivity of research outcomes are compatible. First, the dependency of
measurement on idealized models poses no threat to the perspective-invariance of measure-
ment outcomes. Second, these models even form a necessary requirement for outcomes to
be considered successful in the first place: it is only in the idealized model of the
measurement process that various diverging operationalizations can be seen as coherent.
4 Applying the model-based account to species delimitation
In section 2, I argued that it is unclear how sophisticated integrative taxonomy provides
a solution to the POD given that the threat of operationalization-dependency still
persists through the choice of background assumptions. This section argues that an
interpretation of the sophisticated approach to integrative taxonomy along the lines of
the model-based approach to measurement shows how species delimitation can be
reliable and objective despite the POD. In order to do this, I discuss a recent integrative
taxonomic study and show how the model-based account of measurement can be
applied to it.
The example concerns a taxonomic study on Opiliones (colloquially known as
daddy longlegs) of the genus Megabunus by Wachter et al. (2015), and more precisely
the part of their study that focuses on the classification of the organisms recognised as
Megabunus rhinoceros (M. rhinoceros from hereon) before the study. The researchers,
who explicitly adopt the view of species as independently evolving lineages, integrate
multiple operationalizations to track independently evolving lineages in this group.
They sample six nuclear markers (nuDNA) and one fragment of a mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA), which are analysed using two and three different methods respectively.15 In
addition, they sample chemical characters, traditional morphometric characters, and use
geometric morphometrics to track changes in the shape of the head and thorax. These
operationalizations are chosen because they have previously been used successfully for
species delimitation in related taxa.
Using a discovery approach (i.e. using these operationalizations to find lineages
without starting from a particular classification hypothesis), these operationalizations
15 They use the GMYC model, the bPTP model and a statistical parsimony network for the mtDNA, and
STRUCTURE and mr.Bayes for the nuDNA. For more on these and other common methods, see Camargo
and Sites (2013) and Leavitt et al. (2015).
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lead to widely different classifications of the organisms traditionally assigned to
M. rhinoceros. The nuDNA data pick out one or three lineages, depending on the
method of analysis. The mtDNA fragment suggests recognising six, four or three
lineages, depending on the method of analysis. No lineage was consistently recovered
over the different DNA-based operationalizations. Finally, the chemical evidence and
both sets of morphological evidence pick out a single lineage. Thus, the integration of
these operationalizations requires the authors to resolve the divergence between at least
five different classifications.
They do this by relying on a combination of converging operationalizations and
evolutionary explanations for incongruent evidence. They propose to recognise the
three lineages picked out by the nuclear markers as independently evolving lineages.
The divergence between the nuDNA and mtDNA operationalizations is explained by
referring to incomplete lineage sorting and introgression of mtDNA.16 Divergence
between multiple analysis methods of mtDNA is explained by particular shortcomings
of the methods. Divergence between the nuDNA and the morphometric evidence is
explained by referring to morphological stasis. Finally, they claim that the failure of the
chemical evidence to pick out the lineages is not surprising given the relatively high
failure rate of this method in related groups. According to the authors, these explana-
tions account for the fact that the three lineages are evolving independently despite the
failure of various operationalizations to pick them out.
These results are then taken as the input for hypothesis-driven research which
evaluates the proposed classification using the same operationalizations with different
data or methods of analysis. These hypothesis-based tests clearly confirm the classifi-
cation. For example, even though geometric morphometrics failed to pick out the three
lineages, significant phylogenetic signal was found in the data, which suggests that
morphological and molecular characters evolved together.17 Similarly, the researchers
found new morphological differences in male genitalia, forelegs and mouthparts that
reliably pick out the three lineages. The authors conclude their case by formally
recognising three independently evolving lineages.
Wachter et al. (2015) explicitly claim that their integrative approach increases the
rigor (p. 877), reliability (p. 863) and objectivity (p. 864) of their results. This echoes
claims in many other studies using a sophisticated integrative approach. To show how
this is possible despite the POD, the remainder of this section will show how the model-
based approach of measurement applies to Wachter et al.’s study of M. rhinoceros.
First, there is a clear distinction in the case-study between the various signs of
evolutionary independence, such as chemical or morphometrical distinctness, and the
way these signs are interpreted in the final knowledge claims about the status of the
lineages. This distinction, which is parallel to that between measurement indications
and outcomes, is illustrated by the difference in meaning between the results of various
16 Introgression and incomplete lineage sorting are two phenomena that commonly cause divergence between
the genealogical histories of various genes within one organism or species. Introgression occurs when genes of
one species invade another species through backcrossing of hybrids with one of the parental species.
Incomplete lineage sorting occurs through the differential sorting of ancestral polymorphisms in different
lineages.
17 Phylogenetic signal is a measure for the dependence between species’ characters that is due to phylogenetic
relations. In the context of morphometric data, it can be defined as the tendency of related species to be more
similar to each other than to species drawn at random from the same phylogenetic tree.
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operationalizations at the start and end of the study. As noted above, the various
mtDNA-based methods initially support six, four or three species. However, this is
not the form in which the mtDNA evidence figures in the knowledge claims about
evolutionary independence that the authors posit at the end of the research. While it still
plays a role there, it has substantially changed and is taken to support the three-species
classification suggested by the nuDNA. Similar examples are provided by the mor-
phological evidence. The point is that these various operationalizations per se are not
interpreted as knowledge about the independence of a lineage. It is only after being
interpreted in line with other evidence and background assumptions that they are used
to make claims about independently evolving lineages.
Second, idealization plays a crucial role in inferring outcomes of species delimitation
from indications of evolutionary independence. Just like physicists idealize the way the
thermometer tracks temperature, Wachter et al. idealize the way various
operationalizations track evolutionary independence. This is shown by the fact that
they start by assuming a direct relation between the various operationalizations and
evolutionary independence: if there are two lineages, then we should expect two
morphologically distinct groups, two monophyletic groups, etc. As it is generally
known that morphology, chemical characters and monophyly of nuDNA and mtDNA
very often fail to track evolutionary independence, this is a highly simplified and
idealized model of these operationalizations and their relation to evolutionary indepen-
dence. Divergence from these idealized representations of the operationalizations is
then accounted for by evolutionary explanations, just like error in temperature mea-
surement was accounted for by referring to the impact of the glass container.
Thus, these explanations connect the actual operationalizations to their idealized
models, and allow the taxonomists to infer information about evolutionary
independence from their indications.
For example, the authors explicitly adopt monophyly for mtDNA as a criterion for
evolutionary independence. This is an idealization, as the effects of incomplete lineage
sorting and introgression make it unlikely that any actual lineage is monophyletic for all
its genes. Understanding the criterion as an idealization helps explain why the lack of
monophyly of the three nuDNA lineages for the mtDNA fragment is not interpreted as
evidence against their evolutionary independence. Instead, the results of the various
mtDNA methods are corrected on the basis of background knowledge about these
methods and evolutionary processes. More precisely, as it is known that the GMYC-
model tends to track population structure rather than species divergence in groups with
life history traits likeM. rhinoceros, this method is taken to overestimate the number of
lineages. Similarly, because of the slower rate of evolution and larger effective popu-
lation size of the nuDNA compared to the mtDNA, it is expected that there are ancestral
polymorphisms retained in the nuDNA and not in the mtDNA. Finally, introgression of
mtDNA genes between two of the nuclear lineages can be expected given the close
proximity of their sampling locations and likely secondary contact between them after
expansion between glacial periods.18 These three points explain the extent to which the
mtDNA operationalizations failed to track evolutionary independence. This allows the
18 The role of glacial refugia and expansion between glacial periods and their role in diversification in these
taxa is investigated in Wachter et al. (2016). The findings in this study agree well with the conclusions of the
2015 paper, thus further tightening the coherence.
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authors to interpret these operationalizations as supporting the hypothesis, even though
they do not meet the criterion of evolutionary independence (i.e. being monophyletic
for the tested genes) that the authors adopted at the start.
Third, the idealization of the operationalizations is necessary for Wachter et al. to
interpret them in a mutually coherent manner. This coherence then plays a crucial role
in how they determine the success of species delimitation. This is noted explicitly by
Wachter et al. (2015, p. 2; see also their reference to Schlick-Steiner et al. 2010) when
they state that species delimitation under their integrative approach is successful only if
all evidence is congruent, or if there are plausible evolutionary explanations for any
incongruent evidence. The reference to plausible evolutionary explanations indicates
that the required coherence is not that between multiple indications of evolutionary
independence, but rather that between the outcomes interpreted in light of other
operationalizations and background knowledge. Thus, the convergence of
operationalizations is taken to be convergence under the idealized models of the
operationalizations. The robustness of the result over the idealized outcomes of multi-
ple operationalizations is then taken as an indication of its reliability.
It is instructive here to compare the role of coherence and robustness in this sophisti-
cated interpretation with that in the standard interpretation. As discussed in section 2, the
standard interpretation infers the reliability of species delimitation from the robustness of
the result over multiple operationalizations. For example, if mtDNA and nuDNA
operationalizations independently pick out the same groups as species, the standard
approach takes this to indicate the reliability of species delimitation. This implicitly relies
on a no-coincidence argument: it is unlikely that these operationalizations would indicate
the same result unless they are both tracking the world reliably. Given that there is no
actual convergence in the case study, and the authors explicitly mould the data to be
convergent, this no-coincidence argument is not doing the work here. Of course, the
convergence of multiple operationalizations still plays a role. For example, Wachter et al.
consider their hypothesis successful because the mtDNA and nuDNA operationalizations
converge within the error ranges and corrections explained by incomplete lineage sorting
and introgression. However, this convergence is not that between the outcomes of multiple
operationalizations interpreted independently, as is the case on the standard approach.
Instead, the convergence here is that between multiple operationalizations that were
originally incongruent, and have then been interpreted and adapted in light of each other
and background knowledge. Thus, the reliability of species delimitation in this case does
not derive from the no-coincidence argument, but from the fit between the convergence
(and divergence) that is predicted and explained by themodels, and the actual convergence
(and divergence) found by the operationalizations. In this way, the sophisticated approach
relies on convergence between multiple operationalizations for reliable species delimita-
tion while avoiding the standard approach’s problem of false negatives.
At this point, there is an important worry that needs to be addressed. One could
argue that given the theoretical vagueness of evolutionary independence and the
complexity of the organic world, evolutionary explanations for diverging evidence
are often easy to come by. For example, incomplete lineage sorting and introgression,
both cited by Wachter et al., occur so frequently in the organic world that one might
think they can be easily invoked to explain the divergence between various DNA-based
operationalizations. If this is true, then the coherence of idealized operationalizations,
which the model-based view takes to indicate reliability, is also easy to come by. The
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risk then is that operationalizations are mistakenly taken to be reliable, and groups are
mistakenly accepted as independently evolving lineages, due to taxonomists trying to
avoid inconsistency by ‘cleaning up’ the data. Thus, it seems that the sophisticated
approach to integrative taxonomy only avoids the standard approach’s risk of false
negatives by risking equally undesirable false positives.19
While it is true that the sophisticated approach runs a higher risk of false positives
than the standard approach, this does not imply that it fails to increase the reliability of
species delimitation. To see this, it is crucial to note that taxonomists can test the fit
between the actual and modelled convergence. If further tests reveal outcomes that fall
outside the error ranges of explanations predicted by the model, this indicates that at
least one of the operationalizations is unreliable in a way that is not accounted for in the
model, or that one or more of the explanations are incorrect. In other words, the
problem noted above can be mitigated by conducting further tests of the coherence
and fit that are taken as indicators of reliability. For example, going back to incomplete
lineage sorting, Degnan and Rosenberg (2009) show that the pattern of incomplete
lineage sorting is highly predictable. Thus, if researchers use incomplete lineage sorting
as an explanation, they can test the robustness of the model by investigating whether
the deviation from the idealized model (i.e. lack of monophyly for mtDNA) has the
expected pattern. If the pattern they find deviates from the expected pattern of incom-
plete lineage sorting, there is no coherence between the various idealized models.
The hypothesis-driven reanalysis of the morphological evidence in Wachter et al.’s
study also provides a good illustration of such a test. The authors explain the divergence
between the morphological evidence (one lineage) and the species hypothesis (three
lineages) by referring to morphological stasis. This explanation is plausible because
well-established, morphologically indistinguishable species have been recognised in
related taxa that, just like M. rhinoceros, have strongly isolated populations and low
dispersal abilities (Keith and Hedin 2012). Importantly, despite the morphological stasis,
these related species showed morphological divergence of male genitalia. According to
the model then, M. rhinoceros groups are expected to show morphological stasis, like
their relatives, except with respect to male genitalia. The authors test for this, collect new
data, and, in line with the expectation, find significant morphological differences. Thus,
this reanalysis acts as a test of the fit between the actual divergence and expected
divergence, and suggests that the coherence is not merely the result of taxonomists
cleaning up the data. A similar example comes from the test for phylogenetic signal in
the change of the head and thorax shape. While geometric morphometrics did not pick
out the three lineages, the model predicts that there should be phylogenetic signal in any
shape changes. This prediction of the model is confirmed by the follow-up test.
In short then, the sophisticated approach holds that the reliability of species delim-
itation is indicated by the fit between the actual convergence and the convergence
explained and predicted by the model. Crucially, this fit can then be tested by follow-up
research like Wachter et al.’s hypothesis-based tests. In this way, the sophisticated
integrative approach avoids the POD and increases the reliability of species delimita-
tion despite relying on the extensive use of background assumptions.
Having shown how the model-based interpretation of the sophisticated approach
increases reliability, we can now turn to the equivalent question of objectivity.
19 I thank Eran Tal and Hasok Chang for pointing out this worry to me.
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It is clear that species delimitation is not objective in the sense of perspective-indepen-
dence, because the attribution of evolutionary independence relies on a particular
idealized representation of the operationalizations. However, this does not mean that
the outcome of species delimitation simply reflects the particular operationalization of
choice. The convergence of various operationalizations (and further tests of coherence)
guarantee that the attribution of evolutionary independence is not merely the artefact of
methodological choices, but is stable across a range of operationalizations and view-
points. Thus, species delimitation on the sophisticated integrative approach is objective
in the sense of a robust perspective-invariance. This perspective-invariance suggests
that integrative species delimitation is not likely to turn out different for each taxono-
mist and her particular methodological choices, and thus can lead to stable and
repeatable species classifications. Note that this robust perspective-invariance applies
only to the idealized representation of the operationalizations; this illustrates the crucial
role that the model plays in the way sophisticated integrative taxonomy increases the
objectivity of species delimitation.
5 Conclusion
This paper has connected species delimitation and the measurement of physical
quantities in order to show that the former, like the latter, can be considered reliable
and objective despite the POD. More specifically, it has argued that the sophisticated
approach to integrative taxonomy can be seen as assessing the convergence between
the outcomes of multiple idealized operationalizations of evolutionary independence.
This convergence of outcomes under idealized models indicates the reliability of the
resulting species classifications. Moreover, the robustness and perspective-invariance
of the resulting classifications provide good reasons to believe that they are objective in
a substantial sense.
Although further development of these ideas is needed, I think they establish at least
three significant points. First, they form an argument against the standard approach to
integrative taxonomy, which holds that species hypotheses require the congruence of
multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence, and should not be accepted
if various lines of evidence disagree (Meiri and Mace 2007; Alström et al. 2008; Vieites
et al. 2009). In addition to this, the arguments support the sophisticated approach and
are in line with recent papers on integrative taxonomy by Schlick-Steiner et al. (2010)
and Padial and De La Riva (2010). Second, the POD as presented in this paper is an
important problem that has remained mostly under the radar in the philosophical debate
on species. I believe that raising this problem is valuable independently of whether the
solution offered here is considered successful. Related to this, the paper shows how an
investigation of the operationalization of species concepts and related epistemological
questions can proceed without getting tangled up in the metaphysical debates of the
species-problem. This is important, as the past decade has seen an explosion of new and
varied methods of species delimitation, most significantly multi-species coalescent-
based methods, and a philosophical investigation of these methods and their assump-
tions is highly due (Camargo and Sites 2013). Finally, and more speculatively, this
paper proposes the idea of thinking about species delimitation as a process of measur-
ing evolutionary independence. In doing so, the paper hints at a way in which the
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notoriously vague notion of evolutionary independence could be clarified. Just like the
use of multiple operationalizations played a crucial role in establishing a precise and
well-defined scale of physical quantities (see Chang 2004 for the example of
temperature), the practice of integrative taxonomy could lead to a more precise notion
of evolutionary independence.
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